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Trends in Covenant Enforcement

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years there have been several hundred reported decisions dealing with the enforcement of covenants.'
These decisions have not only come from the few states that have a
high concentration of housing controlled by covenants. They represent the current state of the law in the vast majority of states.
The fact that there have been so many covenant cases is less
surprising when one considers that it has been estimated that
there are approximately thirty-seven million people living in common interest communities, which include condominiums, planned
communities and stock cooperatives. Many millions more live in
traditional housing that is controlled by covenants.3 Considering it
is predicted that by the year 2000, twenty-five to thirty percent of
Americans will live in common interest communities controlled by
covenants, one can expect an increasing number of covenant cases
to be decided.
This Article will survey recent decisions involving the enforcement of covenants and rules in community associations and
identify trends courts are likely to follow in deciding future cases.
The Article will discuss: 1) the courts' change of attitude regarding
the moment at which covenants attach to land; 2) guidelines courts

1. The term covenant will be used throughout this article regardless of
whether the remedy sought is money damages or an injunction. Historically,
courts have distinguished between covenants and servitudes based upon the
remedy sought. 9 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
60.11 (1997). The prima facie case for enforcement was different depending
on whether one was seeking a legal or equitable remedy. Id. Several trea-

tises have been written dealing with the difference between the development
of covenant and servitude law. This topic is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d 1314
(Cal. 1995); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982); Uriel Reichman, Toward
a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1982); Lawrence
Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 167 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (Tentative

Draft No. 14, forthcoming May 1998), for a discussion of the history of covenant and servitude law.
2. The Community Associations Institute estimated that at the end of
1992, there were approximately 150,000 community associations housing 32
million people. COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS FACT BOOK (Clifford J. Treese ed.,
1993). Based on income tax returns and U.S. Census Bureau information,

Clifford Treese (the editor of the factbook) estimates that at the end of 1997,
this number increased to approximately 175,000 community associations
housing 37 million people. Conversation with Clifford J. Treese, Editor,
Community Associations FactBook (Feb. 26, 1998).
3. While this article discusses some cases involving traditional housing,

most of the cases deal with homes in common interest communities. These
include condominiums, planned communities and cooperatives.
4. Evan McKenzie, Welcome Home. Do As We Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1994, at A23.
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are using to determine if covenants should be enforced; 3) cases
dealing with enforcement of specific covenants; and 4) cases dealing with defenses to covenant enforcement.5
II. COURTS ARE INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF
COVENANTS
Courts are increasingly recognizing the advantage of restrictions on land. This trend is evidenced by some courts' comments
regarding the impact of covenants on land values, rulings making
it easier for covenants to attach to land, and judicial modifications
to the guidelines historically used to interpret covenants.
A. Courts Are Increasingly Likely to Find That CovenantsAttach
to Land
In the past couple of years, one of the most significant cases to
address the point at which covenants attach to land has been Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson.6 This California Supreme Court decision involved owners who alleged that a residential use restriction prohibited the operation of a winery and the
raising of llamas.7 Before discussing the merits of the case, the
court noted that the law of restrictive covenants is not easy to decipher.8 It quoted Professor Rabin who stated:
The law in this area is an unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul
who ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred.

Some, the smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up

something easier like the income taxation of trusts and estates.
Others, having lost their way, plunge on and after weeks of effort
emerge not far from where they began, clearly the worse for wear.
On looking back they see the trail they thought they broke obscured
with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few willingly take up
the challenge again."
The court then noted that it had to venture into the wilderness of
covenant law."° Residents of California are fortunate the court did
because first, it greatly simplified existing law even though it
claimed to be following existing law, 1 and second, it applied its
5. Because the law of many states will be discussed, some of the trends
identified may not exist in a particular jurisdiction.
6. 906 P.2d 1314 (Cal. 1995).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1316.
9. Id. (quoting E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY
LAW 489 (1974)).
10. Id.
11. This case involved covenants in a traditional subdivision. Under California law, servitude enforcement in common interest communities is controlled by the Davis Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIV.
CODE §1354(e) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). See Anderson, 906 P.2d at 1329-41
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ruling retroactively.
The court's decision was based on the following facts. In 1950,
an owner of a parcel divided it into sixty lots. 12 In 1958, he recorded a declaration including restrictions which, among other
things, purported to limit all the lots to residential use only and to
limit the type of pets permitted on the lots. 3 Then he sold the lots
by conveying deeds that did not mention the restrictions."' The defendants purchased one of these lots."
The owner of the adjacent property also subdivided his property.8 He, too, recorded a declaration of restrictions and then sold
the parcels without mentioning the restrictions in the deeds. The
defendants purchased one of these lots as well. 7 Thus, the defendants purchased two lots where neither the original grant deeds,
nor any other deed in the chain of title, referred to the restrictions.'"
The majority opinion identified the issue as follows: Is a declaration that 1) establishes a common plan for a subdivision by
imposing restrictions on the lots, 2) describes the property to be
bound, and 3) states that the declaration is to bind all owners, enforceable against owners in the subdivision, even if their deeds do
not mention the restrictions?" The court concluded that if the
above criteria are met, the restrictions are enforceable."o
Therefore, under California law if the declaration of covenants in a subdivision is recorded, the covenants are enforceable
under common law." If a declaration for a common interest community is recorded, the restrictions are enforceable pursuant to
statute." Covenants no longer need to be mentioned in every deed,
or even in any deed, to be enforceable." In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated that, "[m]utual restrictions on the use of
property that are binding upon, and enforceable by, all units in a
development are becoming ever more common and desirable.""
This preference in favor of covenants is of relatively recent origin
and is increasingly being recognized by courts throughout the
country.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Timberstone Homeowners
(Kennard, J., dissenting), for a discussion of previously existing law.
12. Anderson, 906 P.2d at 1316.
13. Id. at 1316-17.
14. Id. at 1317.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1316.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Anderson, 906 P.2d at 1316.
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Ass'n v. Summerlin"5 also held that when a restrictive covenant is
recorded, the purchaser is charged with legal notice of the restriction, even if it is not stated in his own deed. 28 Recordation implies
knowledge, and knowledge implies acceptance.2 7 Thus, an owner
who challenged the association that filed a lien for delinquent assessments against his property was unable to persuade the court
that he had not accepted the obligation to pay assessments.' The
covenant was recorded, it related to the land because the money
was used to maintain the common area and, consequently, it was
enforceable. 9
Another case decided in 1996 by the Georgia Court of Appeals
is legally consistent, but troublesome. In Springmont Homeowners
0 a developer
Ass'n v. Barber,"
executed and delivered a security
deed to a bank involving property that ultimately became a subdivision.2 ' The bank properly recorded the deed.12 Eighteen
months later, the developer recorded a declaration of restrictions
that required prior approval to construct a structure on the property. 3 The developer sold 302 lots and the bank foreclosed on the
remaining 28 lots." A person who purchased one of the twentyeight lots built on it without seeking approval from the association. 0 When the association filed suit, the owner claimed that his
property was not bound by the restrictions. 6 The court of appeals
agreed with the owner. It reasoned that the bank took title before
the restrictions in the declaration were imposed, and that the
bank's Acknowledgment and Consent gave public notice that the
Security Deed was not subject to the restrictions. 7
While the decision may be technically correct, it creates the
very problem identified by the Anderson court. As a result of this
decision, some of the lots in the community are bound by the restrictions while others are not. The case did not indicate if the result so frustrated the common scheme that none of the lots should
be bound, but presumably this argument could be raised even by
those who did agree to be bound by the covenants.
A question as to when a specific covenant, in this case one imposing assessments, attaches also was raised in Mountain View
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

467 S.E.2d 330 (Ga. 1996).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.

30. 472 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 1996).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n v. Scott' and Aluminum Industries Corp. v. Camelot Trails Condominium Corp."' In Mountain
View, owners of a condominium unit alleged that they were not
obligated to pay assessments because their "unit" had not yet been
constructed. 0 The court concluded that by accepting the deed, the
owners were bound by the covenant requiring them to pay periodic
assessments." There was nothing in the Arizona statute or the association's governing documents42 to suggest otherwise.4
The court in Aluminum Industries relied on a Wisconsin statute to conclude that condominium property on which no construction has taken place is a "unit" and, thus, bound by all the covenants, including one providing for assessments for common
expenses.U However, in this case the statute provided that assessments would be collected on unconstructed units unless the
declaration provided otherwise. 45 The declaration provided that
assessments would only be collected once the unit was constructed.' 6 Thus, according to the declaration the covenant to pay
assessments did not attach to the land prior to construction.47
As demonstrated by the aforementioned cases, courts are
more likely to find today, than in the past, that covenants attach to
land. They will not make this finding, however, with respect to
particular covenants if the declaration provides otherwise.
B. CourtsAre UsingNew Guidelines Making It Easier to Enforce
Covenants
Courts are not only increasingly likely to find that covenants
attach to land, they are also making it easier to enforce covenants
by adopting guidelines for interpretation that favor enforcement.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to enforce covenants reasoning that covenants unreasonably restrain the free alienation of
land. One can still find cases in which courts assert this position.
For instance, one court stated that, "[wihen interpreting a covenant, a court should strictly construe its language and all doubts
and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of natural rights and

38. 883 P.2d 453 (Ariz. 1994).
39. 535 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1995).

40. Mountain View, 883 P.2d at 455.
41. Id. at 458.
42. See id. at 456 (explaining that the governing documents of a condominium, planned community or cooperative include the Articles of Incorporation,
if any, the declaration or proprietary lease, the bylaws and rules enacted by
the board of directors or trustees).
43. Id. at 456-57.
44. Aluminum Indus., 535 N.W.2d at 576-77.
45. Id. at 577.
46. Id. at 578.
47. Id. at 581.
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against restrictions on the use of property."' Another court indicated that, "[v]alid covenants restricting the free use of land, although widely used, are not favored and must be strictly construed ... [s]ubstantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved
against the restrictions and in favor of the free use of property." 9
While yet another court explains that, "[a]lthough restrictive covenants are valid and will be recognized and enforced when established by contract between the parties involved.., they are not favored in the law and will be strictly construed, with all reasonable
doubts resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of land
and against the restriction. 0
In these cases, however, the courts enforced the covenants because after they recognized that covenants are to be strictly construed, they made the following observations. "Nevertheless," said
one court, "equity will enforce restrictions when they are reasonable and the intention of the parties is clear."5 Another court articulated that, "[w]here there is no inconsistency or ambiguity
within a restrictive covenant, the clear and plain language of the
covenant is enforceable by injunctive relief."52 Still another provided that, "this rule [strict construction] will not be applied to ignore or override the specific language or obvious purpose of a restriction."53 Thus, while courts pay homage to history by stating
that covenants are to be strictly construed, they increasingly find
reasons to enforce covenants.5
The Florida courts were among the first in the community association field to recognize the importance of enforcing covenants.
In Hidden HarborEstates, Inc. v. Basso,55 the court stated that restrictions in the declaration:
[A]re clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which
arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his
unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. Such
restrictions are very much in the nature of covenants running with
the land and they will not be invalidated absent a showing that they
are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public ?licy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.?
This court's view of the importance of covenants as a land control

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Gerber v. Hamilton, 659 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ill. App. 1995).
Woodward v. Morgan, 475 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 1996).
Carpenter v. Davis, 688 So. 2d 256, 258 (Ala. 1997).
Woodward, 475 S.E.2d at 810.
Carpenter,688 So. 2d at 258.
53. Gerber,659 N.E.2d at 445.
54. See James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes:
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 1 (1989).

55. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
56. Id. at 639-40.
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device is very different from the critical way in which courts
viewed covenants in the past.
The trend toward enforcing covenants in common interest
communities was given additional strength by recent decisions in
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals and the California Supreme
Court. In Noble v. Murphy, 7 decided by the Massachusetts Court
of Appeals in 1993, the managers of a condominium sought to remove two pet dogs from a unit owned by the defendant because the
dogs were kept in violation of a bylaw restriction banning all pets."
In recognizing the validity of the bylaw restriction, the court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to apply close judicial scrutiny of restrictions that are fundamentally proper because it would
deny the developer and owners desirable planning flexibility. 9
The court also cited Hidden Harbor for the proposition that restrictions in the declaration are "clothed with a strong presumption of validity."0 As a result, even a restriction in the declaration
that is, to a certain degree, unreasonable may still be upheld.6'
The court also noted that efficiency favors enforcement of restrictions in the declaration and original bylaws unless they violate public policy or are unconstitutional. 2 It prevents courts and
the owners from having to engage in burdensome and expensive
litigation involving the facts of each owner's unique reasons for
violating the covenants.6 Thus, the court affirmed the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment.r'
The California Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n. 65 In Nahrstedt,
a woman owned three cats that she never let out of her unit.' The
declaration provided that unit owners could only keep domestic
fish and birds.6 7
The condominium association fined Mrs.
Nahrstedt for violating the governing documents." In response to
the fine, Mrs. Nahrstedt filed suit alleging, among other things,
that the covenant was not enforceable against indoor cats.
Although the court relied on California Civil Code § 1354,
which provides that covenants are enforceable as equitable servi-

57. 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 267.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 268.
878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 1277-78.
Id. at 1278 n.3.
Id. at 1278-79.
Id.
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tudes unless unreasonable,7" much of the reasoning the court used
could have applied even if no relevant statute existed. The court
began by recognizing that a stable and predictable living environment is crucial to the success of residential common interest developments." It further noted that covenants are the primary means
of ensuring this stability and predictability.7 ' The court also acknowledged that stability of common interest communities is particularly important when one considers the large number of people
living in them. 3
The California Supreme Court also reasoned that if the courts
evaluated covenant validity according to each owner's particular
facts and circumstances, there would be a proliferation of expensive and unnecessary litigation. 74 As a result, the court held that
the validity of covenants contained in the declaration should only
be evaluated in the context of the common interest community as a
whole.7' These cases indicate that there is a trend toward court enforcement of covenants in a declaration unless the covenant is unreasonable when viewed in the context of the common scheme as a
whole.
While there is a trend toward enforcement of covenants, not
all covenants will be enforced. The Nahrstedt court stated that
covenants are unreasonable when they 1) violate public policy; 2)
do not bear a rational relationship to the protection, operation or
purpose of the common interest community; or 3) when the harm
caused by enforcement of the restriction is so disproportionate to
the benefit produced to the community that the covenant should
not be enforced.76 Restrictions that may. violate public policy include restrictions that violate state and federal constitutions if77
state action were present, such as covenants prohibiting "for sale"
or political 78 signs anywhere and any time in a community. 79 In

some circumstances, a constitutional covenant may violate public
policy as where residential use restrictions prohibit all home businesses or home day care facilities. 8 These restrictions are discussed below in the sections dealing with specific covenants.8'
The California Supreme Court's example of a covenant that
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
71. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278.
72. Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1286-87.
Linmark Ass'n v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).

79. See infra Part IV for a discussion of constitutional defenses.

80. See infra Part III, Section A. for a discussion of use restrictions that are
constitutional but may violate public policy.
81. See infra Part III.
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bears no rational relationship to the operation or preservation of
the community is Laguna Royale v. Darger." In this case, a covenant in the declaration required unit owners to obtain board approval of all sales or lease agreements.' The court held that the
covenant was valid, but deemed the board's refusal to permit an
owner to transfer his three-fourths interest to three other families
to be unreasonable.' The court reasoned that there were no facts
indicating successive ownership by four families would create
problems not caused by the use of the residence by a single family.85 Further, the declaration specifically permitted leasing for
periods of ninety days or more.' The court explained that four
families successively leasing the unit for ninety days would have
no different impact than four families owning a unit and successively occupying it for ninety days.87
It is important to note that the issue in Laguna did not concern whether the covenant provision requiring board approval of
unit transfers was valid. Rather, the issue under examination was
whether the exercise of board discretion in these particular circumstances was proper.' If the covenant precluded transfer of the
unit to four or more people, the court probably would have enforced the covenant.
Finally, courts will not enforce covenants where the burden of
enforcement substantially outweighs the benefits to the community. Assume a covenant requires owners to use a particular paint
on the exterior of their homes which, as time passes, becomes extremely difficult to obtain. In these circumstances, a court is likely
to conclude that it is unreasonable to require use of that particular
paint and that a similar, more easily procurable paint would suffice.
Although courts do permit exceptions to the general principle
favoring enforceability of covenants, it is important to emphasize
the courts' insistence on covenant enforcement. The Nahrstedt
court states that "common interest developments are a more intensive and efficient form of land use that greatly benefits society
and expands opportunities for home ownership." 9 The court goes
on to say that enforcing covenants is the "primary means of
achieving the stability and predictability so essential to the success
of a shared ownership housing development." 90

82. 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

83. Id. at 138.
84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Nahrstedt,878 P.2d at 1288.
Id. at 1287.
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In 1995, the North Carolina Supreme Court continued the
trend toward enforcement in Raintree Homeowners Ass'n v. Bleimann."' In this case, a covenant in the declaration required owners to obtain permission from the architectural review committee
prior to making changes to their property."' The covenant specifically provided that the architectural committee could withhold approval for any reason, including purely aesthetic ones." The court
recognized that covenants granting architectural review committees broad discretion to approve all construction in the community
are enforceable absent a showing that the committee acted in bad
faith or arbitrarily.'
The architectural review committee, in this case, refused to
permit the defendant to install aluminum siding on his home even
though the defendant introduced evidence that the siding was of
high quality, and that it simulated the wood finishes of other
houses in the neighborhood.9' After visiting the defendant's property, the committee denied his request stating that the area was
rustic and the siding would not age like the rest of the exteriors."
The jury concluded that the committee acted arbitrarily and the
appellate court refused to permit enforcement of the board rule. 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, held that because
there was no evidence that the committee had acted arbitrarily or
in bad faith, the case should not have gone to a jury.' The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court and ordered it to
enter a judgment not withstanding the verdict in favor of the association."
The Florida Court of Appeals faced a similar issue in Korandovitch v. Vista PlantationCondominium Ass'n." Once again, the
covenant at issue required unit owners to seek board approval before altering their units.' When owners asked for permission to
affix street numbers to the outside of their units, the board denied
the requests."2 The court referred to previous Florida decisions in
concluding that the restriction was clothed with a strong presumption of validity."' However, had the covenant specifically
prohibited the owners from affixing street numbers to their units,
91. 463 S.E.2d 72 (N.C. 1995).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.

99. Id. at 76.
100.
101.
102.
103.

634 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 275.
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the court probably would have upheld the board's decision. Because there was no such covenant in place, the -court concluded
that the board's action should be judged by the reasonableness
standard and remanded the case. 10' While the court left the ultimate question of reasonableness for the lower courts to decide, the
appellate court did question whether the association might have
1
been overly conscientious in its "zeal for conformity." 05
Based on the aforementioned cases, a clear trend has developed among the courts since Hidden Harbour. The courts have
recognized the importance of covenants in creating stability and
enhancing property values. This trend not only appears in the
case law, but also in the draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)." Section 3.1 of the preliminary draft of the Restatement provides that, "[a] servitude meeting the requirements
of Chapter 2 is valid unless the arrangement it purports to implement infringes a constitutionally protected right, contravenes a
statute or governmental regulation, or violates a public policy.""'
The Rationale of the Comment to this section states that "[t]he
rule... recognizes the widespread acceptance and use of servitudes in modern land development by establishing the validity of
servitudes as the norm, rather than the exception. This rule accords the same presumption of validity to servitude arrangements
as that accorded other consensual commercial arrangements.""°
Thus, the trend favoring enforcement of covenants is likely to continue.

III. TRENDS IN ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIFIC COVENANTS AND RULES
As mentioned previously, since Hidden Harbour,' 9 courts
have distinguished between covenants appearing in the declaration or proprietary lease and rules enacted by the board. While
courts increasingly presume covenant validity, they will more
closely scrutinize board-enacted rules. Courts use one of two doctrines when evaluating board rules - the rule of reason and the
business judgment doctrine."' Because the cases in this section
104. Id.
105. Id. at 275.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (Tentative

Draft No.

14, forthcoming May 1998).
107. Id. § 3.1.
108. Id. § 3.1 cmt. a.
109. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. See generally Wayne S. Hyatt, The Business Judgment Rule and Com-

munity Associations:Recasting the Imperfect Analogy, 1 CAI'S J. COMMUNITY
ASS'N L. 2 (1998) (discussing the propriety of the business judgment rule "as a
or the standard in common-interest community cases"); Jeffrey Goldberg,
Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment

Doctrine, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 653 (1988) (explaining that the reasonableness
test is used to restrict a board's discretion by permitting only those rules that
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only apply the rule of reason, the business judgment doctrine will
not be discussed. Under the reasonableness test, the court can invalidate a board's enforcement of a rule if it finds that: 1) the
board exceeded the scope of its authority; 2) the rule was unreasonable; or 3) the board did not apply the rule in a manner consistent with the governing documents and the law.'
Thus, when
reading this section of the article, one should be conscious of the
distinction between enforcement of covenants and rules and the
different standards used by the courts.
A. Residential Use Restrictions
While the California Supreme Court in Nahrstedtl" affirmed
the presumption in favor of covenant enforceability, it did not extend this presumption to covenants that violate public policy."' In
the future, there are two areas in which courts may find that absolute restrictions violate public policy. Both areas involve nonresidential uses of units within the association.
1. Courts Are Likely to Find That Home Businesses with Minimal
External Impact Do Not Violate Residential Use Restrictions
First, courts are likely to find that prohibitions against home
businesses that have no external impact on the neighborhood violate public policy. After the 1994 earthquake in Los Angeles,"'
businesses were encouraged to permit their workers capable of
performing their jobs at home to do so."' The goal was to reduce
the number of drivers on the freeways, and 'it worked. Even in the
absence of an earthquake, reducing traffic and reducing pollution
associated with traffic is desirable. "
reasonably relate to an association's objectives while the business judgment

doctrine imposes fiduciary duties upon association boards when creating and
enforcing rules).
111. See Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass'n, 634 So.2d
273, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that when a board promulgates a

rule not provided for in the condominium declaration, it must meet a reasonableness requirement; arbitrary and capricious rules will not be upheld).
112. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).

113. See id. at 1287-88 (holding that although courts generally defer to the
"wisdom of the agreed-to restrictions," courts will not enforce use restrictions
that violate public policy).
114. See The Magnitude 6.7 Northridge, California,Earthquake of 17 January 1994, AM. ASSN FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. 366 (Oct. 21, 1994), available in 1994 WL 12777756 (stating that the earthquake occurred in
Northridge, California at 4:30 a.m. on January 17, 1994).
115. See Julian Beltrame, Los Angeles to Pick up the Pieces; Quake's Toll at
40 Dead and 1,800 Injured;About 20,000 Still Homeless, MONTREAL GAZETTE,
Jan. 19, 1994, at A8 (noting that local officials pleaded with residents to remain in their homes).
116. See Michael Cabanatuan, Telecommute/Traffic Provides Incentive for
Working From Home, THE SAN FRANcISCo CHRON., Sept. 11, 1997, at A15
(explaining that after incidents like earthquakes, more employers encourage
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Also, considering the expense and limited supply of competent
childcare providers and facilities, 7 permitting people to work at
home benefits children and society. Having a parent in the home
when a child comes home from school is obviously desirable for society.11 8
At this point, whether one considers home businesses to be
desirable or not may be irrelevant. It has been estimated that by
the year 2014, eighty percent of Americans may work in mobile or
satellite telecommuting centers, and that the vast majority of this
work will be done from home office environments." Therefore, the
challenge for many associations will be to create guidelines for deciding when home businesses are permitted and when they are
not.
Recent cases do not offer much guidance for the creation of
such guidelines. In Houck v. Rivers,"' a house, carriage house and
kitchen house were part of a three-unit condominium with covenants restricting the use of the units to residences, offices and
studios used in connection with home occupation."' One owner
operated a bed and breakfast that the court held to be in violation
of the covenant. 2' The owner argued that the use was consistent
with the zoning definition of home occupation, but the court concluded that the covenant, not zoning, controlled. 1 ' A bed and
breakfast clearly has substantial external impacts, and thus is not
likely to fall within even liberal guidelines for home businesses.
In Gerber v. Hamilton,"' the court provided a little more
guidance. In this case, a covenant in a residential subdivision
prohibited commercial uses but permitted an owner to do professional work in his or her home as long as no signs or advertising

their employees to work out of the home to help reduce stress related to traffic
congestion which, in turn, reduces the amount of traffic).
117. See Marian, Wright Edelman, Clinton's Child-Care Initiative Is Good
News for U.S. Children, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1998, at 9 (acknowledging the
"daunting" cost and poor quality of day care facilities and providers).
118. See id. (observing that over five million children return to an empty

home after school each day).
119. Robert Treadway, Community of the Future, Remarks Before the
Community Associations Institute (May 2, 1997). In making his estimate,

Treadway relied on the results of two different studies presented to the World
Future Society in July 1996. Id. The first was from a population study con-

ducted at George Washington University under the direction of William Halal.
Id. The Institute for Alternative Futures did the second study in Arlington,

Virginia. Id.
120. 450 S.E.2d 106 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
121. Id. at 107-08.
122. See id. at 108 (finding that "the particular use of her [the owner's]
home as a bed and breakfast operation is not permitted by the Master Deed
123. Id.
124. 659 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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announced the activity.125 The defendants operated a beauty salon
in her home three and one-half days a week resulting in thirty-five
to forty customer vehicles entering and leaving the neighborhood
on a weekly basis."' 6 Hair dryers and clients also produced excessive noise." The court concluded that the defendants went beyond
merely engaging in professional work at home and, instead, set up
It reasoned that
a business in violation of the covenants."
"professional work" applied to owners bringing work home or performing certain at-home professions while preserving the residential character of the neighborhood."
Therefore, if the community has a residential use restriction,
associations should consider creating guidelines that permit home
business that preserve the residential character of the neighborhood and have limited 'external impact on the neighborhood. For
example, if a business is conducted using computers and phone
lines and has no external impact on the neighborhood, the business probably should be allowed. If a business, such as a person
offering piano lessons eight hours a day, brings significantly more
traffic, noise and congestion to an already densely populated condominium community, the business should be prohibited. It is important for the community to create its own home business guidelines before the matter arises in litigation where a court is likely to
impose its own guidelines.
2. CourtsAre Likely to Find Some Home Day Care Businesses Do
Not Violate Residential Use Restrictions
A second area in which associations should at least consider
guidelines, if the courts have not already imposed them, is the
area of home day care. The absence of adequate day care facilities
has received much attention recently.'
When one considers this
increasing publicity and the fact that several states already permit
some forms of home day care, even when covenants prohibit nonresidential uses, 2 ' courts presently interpreting residential use restrictions to ban day care facilities are likely to modify their holdings.

125. Id. at 444.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 446.
See Richard Wolf, Childcare Tested as a Solution to Welfare, USA

TODAY, Jan. 16, 1997, at A4 (discussing child care concerns with respect to

quality and cost).
131. See generally Annotation, Children'sDay-Care Use as Violation of Restrictive Covenant, 29 A.L.R. 4th 730 (1996) (observing that numerous courts
have allowed home daycare facilities even where covenants restrict use of
homes to residential purposes).
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Stewart v. Jackson".. and Metzner v. Wojdyla," both decided
in 1994, demonstrate the present split of authority in many jurisdictions. In Stewart, one can guess the outcome of the case in the
first paragraph of the decision. The court begins by stating, "[w]e
are mindful of the impact of our decision on today's society .... ,
In this case, a woman operated a day care facility for four children
plus her own child and her nephew.' 3' Because of the small number of children for which she cared, she was not required to obtain
a day care license from the state.3
The court referred to the particular facts of the case and
changes in societal conditions in concluding that home day care
that did not necessitate state licensing did not violate the residential use restriction. 137 First, in this case, only three children were
driven to the day care facility.
Although the traffic increased
somewhat when the children were dropped off, the impact was
slight.9 The children only occasionally played outdoors. 14' Even if
the children had played outside, their behavior was consistent
with normal residential use."' Further, four other people in the
neighborhood provided day care in their homes, and the residential use restriction had previously been violated by the operation of
home business involving a toy wholesaler, a part-time computer
consultant and a woman giving piano lessons.'
Based on these facts one might conclude that home day care
will be limited to Indiana when facts indicate that residential use
restrictions have already been violated. To so conclude, however,
would be a mistake. While the Stewart court discussed particular
facts, it also considered Indiana public policy that recognizes the
advantages of children being cared for in a home setting and societal conditions that have changed since covenants were first enacted. 43 It stated:
We note that these particular restrictive covenants became effective
in 1978 when many mothers did not work outside the home and
cared for their children in their own homes. We believe, as did Jus-

132. 635 N.E.2d 186 (Ind.Ct. App. 1994).
133. 886 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1994).
134. Stewart, 635 N.E.2d at 188.

135. Id. at 192 (citing Metzer, 882 P.2d at 155).
136. Id. at 190.
137. See id. at 193 ("[w]eighing the minimal obtrusiveness and the public
policy supporting home day care against the legal meaning of residential use
covenant here, we find that unlicensed home daycare is a residential use
and... did not violate the restrictive covenants").
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Stewart, 635 N.E.2d at 193.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 188.
143. Id. at 193.
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tice Krahulik in Clem H, that covenants restricting the use of property to residential purposes and barring commercial use were not
intended to prohibit unlicensed home day care. Because it could not
be foreseen that day care homes would become so prevalent in light
of the significant increase in the number of two working-parent
households, we cannot find that these restrictive covenants contemplated the exclusion of unlicensed day care homes as commercial businesses.'"
Therefore, even if the residential use restriction had not been
violated in the past, it is safe to conclude the court would have
held that unlicensed home day care did not violate the residential
use restriction.
The Washington Supreme Court in Metzner held that a licensed daycare facility violated a residential use restriction. 145 Because Stewart dealt with an unlicensed facility and Metzner with a
licensed facility, one might conclude that this is the only reason
the courts arrived at opposite holdings. This distinction is too superficial, however.
In Metzner, the defendants were required to obtain a license
to provide home day care for ten or fewer children.'" They generally provided home care for four children in addition to their own
two children."7 Thus, the defendants in both Metzner and Stewart
were taking care of approximately the same number of children.'"
The defendants in both cases also charged for their services.""
Therefore, the two cases are factually similar. The difference between the two holdings is that the Stewart court emphasized the
public policy in favor of home day care,' 5° while the Metzner court
reasoned that there should be a bright line."' The Metzner court
concluded that the defendants were clearly operating a business
and, therefore, violated the
restriction limiting use of the property
2
to residential uses only."1
As courts recognize the societal problem of providing adequate child care in home settings and as the national agenda
moves toward specific proposals for getting families off welfare, it
is likely that courts will try to find exceptions for some home day
care. The exceptions are less likely to be based on whether or not
a license is required and more likely to be based on the external
impact on the neighborhood. Therefore, those communities with
144. Id. The court left the issue of licensed home daycare to be decided by a
future Indiana court. Id. at 190.
145. 886 P.2d 154, 158 (Wash. 1994).
146. Id. at 155, 156.
147. Id. at 155.

148. Id.; Stewart, 635 N.E.2d at 192.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Stewart, 635 N.E.2d at 193; Metzner, 886 P.2d at 157.
Stewart, 635 N.E.2d at 193.
Metzner, 886 P.2d at 157.
Id. at 158.
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covenants prohibiting nonresidential uses should be thinking
about guidelines for regulating home day care that are based on
factual distinctions between traditional residences and home day
care facilities.
For example, noise guidelines will be difficult to impose for
home day care facilities with a small number of children. There is
little difference, if any, between the noise generated by a family
with four small children and a day care with four small children.
This same principle should apply to use of common areas. Four
children from a family using the common area are unlikely to have
a substantially different impact upon the common area than four
children from a day care facility.
On the other hand, operating a home day care may create
unique liability in the common area for associations. If it does, it
would be reasonable for the association to require the operator of
home day care to pay for additional insurance.
Because the guidelines are likely to appear in the form of
board rules rather than covenants, they are likely to be subject to
greater scrutiny than covenants. Thus, they should be enacted in
accordance with the governing documents and law. They should
also be reasonable as well as reasonably applied. A court is unlikely to find a rule reasonable if it discriminates against home day
care facilities unless the particular problem the rule addresses
only arises as a result of the home day care arrangement.
B. Rental RestrictionsAre Likely to Increase in Number and
Variety
Another distinct trend involves the desire of many community
associations to control the ability of owners to rent their units and
to control the rights of renters. Whether a particular approach
will succeed depends on the association's authority to enact the
particular restriction, the reasonableness of the restriction and
whether the association followed reasonable procedures in enforcing the restriction.
One approach is to control leasing by imposing an additional
charge on those persons leasing units or lots. In Miesch v. Ocean
Dunes Homeowners Ass'n, 53 the board imposed a "user fee" on tenants who rented for fewer than twenty-eight days." The fee was
used to pay association employees who registered renters and
guests, dispensed orientation packets and informed renters about
the facilities. 55 The association also used the money to provide security services to enforce the association's rules regarding use of
M

153. 464 S.E.2d 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).

154. Id. at 66.
155. Id.
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the common area.
The court found that the user fees violated two provisions of
the governing documents."' First, the governing documents stated
that the owners had an easement to use the common area, and the
court found that the user fee interfered with the owners' easement." Second, the governing documents provided that common
expenses were to be assessed against owners in proportion to their
ownership interest." 9 The user fee was based on short term rental,
not ownership interest, so the court concluded that the board exceeded the scope of its authority in enacting the user fee and declared the user fee invalid.' 6°

The board in Graham v. Board of Directors of Riveredge Village Condominium Ass'n, 6' tried a different approach in controlling renters. It passed a rule requiring minimum one month
leases and fixing the monthly assessment for an owner in any
rental month
at $200, rather than the normal $100 monthly as62
sessment. 1

The board relied on Beachwood Villas Condominiums v.
Poor,6 3 which held that the board of a condominium did have
authority to enact rental restrictions.'" The court, however, held
that Beachwood was inapplicable because the declaration involved
in the litigation granted the board authority to regulate the use of
the units.1" Because the declaration in Graham gave the board
authority to regulate the common areas and said nothing about
the units or the limited common areas, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the board exceeded the scope of its authority
when it enacted the rule." The court further found that even if
the board had the authority to enact such a rule, the rule was unreasonable because the community was a vacation community and
there was little or no demand for monthly rentals. 1 7 If the rule
were enforced, it would have the practical effect of eliminating an

156. Id.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Id.

159. Miesch, 464 S.E.2d at 67.
160. Id. at 68.
161. No. 03A01-9404-CH-00137, 1994 WL 597009, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
2, 1994).

162. Id. at *1.
163. 448 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
164. Id. at 1145.
165. Graham, 1994 WL 597009, at *3.

166. Id. at *6-7.
167. Id. at *4. The court also noted that declaration provided that no
amendment could discriminate against any unit owner or class of unit owner.
Id. So, even if the provision restricting leasing had been adopted by amendment to the declaration and presumably not been subjected to the reasonable-

ness test, it still would have been invalid.
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owner's right to rent.16
In Breezy Point Holiday Harbor Lodge-Beachside Apartment
Owners' Ass'n v. B.P. Partnership,6 9 however, the board was successful in controlling renters.' In this case, the owners passed an
amendment to the declaration providing that owners could rent
units only as permitted by the board. 7' The board then enacted a
rule prohibiting owners from leasing their units more than fourteen days per year.'7' The defendants argued that the rental restriction was a restraint on alienation and, therefore, void.173 The
court disagreed. 14 It concluded that the restriction was a use restriction, not a restraint on alienation, and even if it was a restraint on alienation, it was a75 reasonable means of addressing the
problems created by renters.1
A restriction on leasing also appeared in the contract and bylaws of a cooperative located in Washington D.C. In Kelley v.
Broadmoor Cooperative Apartments,'76 the contract prohibited
apartment-leasing arrangements entered into without the written
consent of the cooperative. 177 The bylaws provided that the board's
control extended to leasing by an owner. 18 The board decided to
impose a five percent surcharge on the monthly assessment of any
owner who leased a unit. 79 The five-percent charge escalated to
twenty-five percent over a period of five years."'
The court concluded the surcharge was reasonable.'' The
board's goal was to protect the owners' investment by encouraging
owner occupancy. 82 The court noted that the contract specifically
gave the board authority to protect the owners' investment, and
the surcharge accomplished this by protecting the homestead exemption and guaranteeing that the co-op would be eligible for
Fannie Mae financing.
Thus, if a specific restriction on leasing appears in the declaration, the courts are likely to find it valid. This is consistent with
the trend in favor of covenant enforcement. If the board, pursuant
to authority in the declaration, enacts the restriction, and the
168. Id.
169. 531 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
170. Id. at 918-20.

171. Id. at 918.
172. Id.

173. Id. at 919.
174. Id.

175. Breezy Point, 531 N.W.2d at 919.
176. 676 A.2d 453 (D.C. 1996).
177. Id. at 455.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461.

182. Kelley, 676 A.2d at 455.
183. Id. at 460.

The John Marshall Law Review

[31:443

court applies the reasonableness test, it is likely to evaluate
whether the rule is reasonable by considering the impact on the
owners. If the declaration contemplates that the owners can lease
their units, and the practical effect of a board rule is to eliminate
all leasing, then the court is more likely to consider the rule unreasonable.
Yet another approach to controlling renters is found in the
California case of Liebler v. Point Loma Tennis Club.!8 In this
case, an owner of a condominium leased his unit, after which, both
he and his tenants used the tennis courts and other common areas.'
The association passed a rule providing that owners who
leased their units transferred the right to use the common areas to
their tenants."8
The court cited Nahrstedt 7 for the proposition that covenants
are presumed to be enforceable, and found that the declaration
gave the board authority to enact the rule for the following reasons: 1) the declaration provided that an owner could not sever his
separate interest in his unit from his interest in tenancy-incommon in the common area;" 2) it specifically gave the owners
authority to delegate their rights of enjoyment to the common area
to tenants who reside on the property, thereby implying those
rights would be delegated; 89 and 3) it gave the board authority to
enact rules regarding the common area.'90
Having found that the board had authority to enact the rule,
the court next examined whether the rule was reasonable. 9 ' It
184. 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
185. Id. at 785.

186. Id. at 786.
187. 878 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Cal. 1994).
188. Liebler, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. The court distinguished an earlier
case, MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992), a case involving an association that prohibited an owner who
leased his unit from using the tennis court. The court stated that a central
distinguishing point was that in Liebler, unlike Major, the declaration contained a prohibition on severing the interest in the unit from the interest in
the common area. Id. at 787. California Civil Code § 1358 prohibited severance of the two interests at the time the MaJor case was decided. The real
distinctions between the two cases were factual. Id. In Major, the tenant
was handicapped and unable to use the tennis courts, the tenant was the
owner's mother and there were facts indicating the association discriminated
against the particular owner and tenant. MaJor, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 239, 249.
Liebler is a better-reasoned decision.
189. Liebler, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 788. It is interesting to note that the court used the Nahrstedt
standard which provides that a covenant is presumed to be reasonable unless,
when viewed in the context of the common interest community as a whole, it
is arbitrary, against public policy or the burden is so disproportionate to the
benefits that it should not be enforced in evaluating the board enacted rule.
Rules are generally judged by a reasonableness standard and are not cloaked
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concluded that the rule was reasonable. 92 The court noted that the
number of tennis courts constructed in any particular common interest community is likely to be based on the proposed number of
occupants. 193 To permit both owners and tenants to use the common areas would overburden the facilities.'94 Finally, the court
found that the board enforced the rule reasonably.' 95 It did not
single out the defendant for enforcement."
All other nonoccupying owners complied with the rule and, upon request, volun197
tarily gave up the card that provided access to the common area.
There is every indication that associations will continue to try
to place restrictions on the owners' right to lease and on the leasing tenants.'
To determine if these restrictions will be upheld,
one should first ascertain whether the specific restriction appears
in the declaration or proprietary lease. If it does not, one should
next evaluate whether the covenants give the board authority to
control leasing or tenants in the particular manner the board is attempting. For example, if the board only can control the common
area, and not the units, it may not be able to restrict leasing of the
units.
If the declaration does authorize the board to make rules regarding leasing, then the association should next assess whether
the restriction is reasonable and reasonably applied. For example,
it may be unreasonable to restrict short term leasing in a vacation
area, whereas it may be reasonable to totally prohibit leasing in a
redevelopment project where the goal is to provide a stable community of owner-occupied units for low and moderate income persons.'9 Regardless of whether the court presumes the restriction
to be valid or subjects it to stricter scrutiny, it is in the best interests of the community to enact reasonable rules and apply them
reasonably.
Finally, the rules must be reasonably applied. If a court believes that the board enacted the restriction to harm a particular
owner, the court is unlikely to enforce the
•i • 20
with the same presumption of validity as covenants.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id.
195. Liebler, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 789.

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Some declarations give the board the same authority the owner has to
evict a tenant for violation of the covenants. The author was unable to find
any reported cases addressing this issue. Because the provision exists in so
many declarations, it is likely to be challenged in the near future.
199. See City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1989) (holding that restrictions were reasonable in view of the city's
'redevelopment goals of providing a stabilized community of owner-occupied
units for low and moderate income persons").
200. MaJor,9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
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C. ArchitecturalRestrictionsAre Likely to Hold Few Surprises
1. Courts Will Continue to Enforce Covenants That GrantBroad
Discretion to ArchitecturalCommittees and Will Continue to Give
Terms Their PlainMeaning
In the past few years, the decisions involving architectural
guidelines have held few surprises. Courts have continued to enforce covenants that grant broad discretionary power to architectural review committees. 2°' For example, in Raintree Homeowners
Ass'n v. Bleimann,2 °2 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a
covenant that permitted the architectural committee to deny an
owner's request to make an improvement based on any grounds,
including purely aesthetic ones.0 3
Courts also have continued to give the covenant's words their
plain meaning. For example, in Carpenter v. Davis,2"' the court
concluded that when a covenant uses the term "dwelling" it means
those areas in which a person dwells and does not include a garage
or a storage room.2 5 In Heck v. Parkview Place Homeowners
Ass'n, °6 the court concluded that a trellis, that was not attached to
the house was not an awning or shutter.0 7 In Zinda v. Krause,2 °8
the court concluded that a covenant which stipulated that owners
could not do anything that would adversely affect the vegetation
meant just that.2°9 An owner could not remove vegetation to construct a deck, place shredded bark on the vegetation thereby inhibiting its growth, or drive over the vegetation.2 0
When the meaning of a covenant is unclear, a court may look
to definitions in a statute or ordinance for guidance in interpreting
the meaning of that covenant. In Brown v. Perkins, 1' the court
was obligated to look to the ordinances because the documents incorporated the ordinances by reference. 12 In this case, the covenant permitted both one and two story structures, but provided

201. See generally John D. Perovich, Annotation, Validity and Construction
of Restrictive Covenant Requiring Consent to the Construction on Lot, 40

A.L.R.3d 864 (1972 & Supp. 1997) (discussing cases dealing with restrictive
covenants that require owners to seek approval of construction plan).
202. 463 S.E.2d.72 (N.C. 1995).
203. Id. at 75. The covenants also provided that the committee was the sole
arbiter. Id.
204. 688 So. 2d 256 (Ala. 1997).

205. Id. at 258.
206. 642 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1202.
528 N.W.2d 55 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 61.
Id.
923 P.2d 434 (Idaho 1996).
Id. at 438.
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different set back requirements for each.213 The question raised
was whether a garage with a bonus room over it was a one or two
story structure. 14 Although neither the covenants nor the architectural guidelines defined the term "story," the ordinance did.215
The court concluded that because the documents did not define
"story," and the definition of "story" did exist in the ordinance at
the time the documents were drafted, the definition contained in
the ordinance controlled.2 6
2. Modular Housing and Mobile Homes Are Less Likely to Violate
RestrictionsProhibitingTrailersand Temporary Structures
Definitions that gave courts trouble in 1995 and 1996 included the words "trailer" and "mobile home." These cases indicate
that in the future, courts may be more reluctant to determine that
modular homes and mobile homes that resemble permanent homes
violate covenants prohibiting trailers and mobile homes.
The covenants in Newman v. Wittmer,217 Beacon Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Palmer Properties, Inc.21 s and Benner v. Hammond 219 prohibited trailers and temporary structures. In deciding
whether a double-wide mobile home was prohibited, both courts
looked to the characteristics of the structure, the applicable statutes and the financing arrangement.220
In Newman, the Montana Supreme Court reiterated the following factors set forth by the district court in concluding that the
home was a mobile home which violated the covenants: 1) the
owners completed a "Mobile/Manufacture Home Movement Declaration" before moving their home; 2) the home was described as a
"Manufactured Home by Fleetwoods"; 3) it required a Montana
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title; 4) it was listed as a "trailer" on
the Certificate of Title; 5) it was not on a permanent foundation;
and 6) it was taxed as personal property."'
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 438.
Id.
917 P.2d 926 (Mont. 1996).

218. 911 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
219. 673 N.E.2d 205 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
220. See Newman, 917 P.2d at 932 (holding that the structure was a mobile

home after examining the statutory definitions of "mobile home" and the
characteristics of the structure itself); Benner, 673 N.E.2d. at 209
(determining that the structure involved was not prohibited due to its permanence, the fact that a mortgage had been acquired to finance it and because it
was taxed as real property); Beacon, 911 S.W.2d at 738 (finding the structure

was prohibited because of its structural characteristics).
221. Newman, 917 P.2d at 930. It should also be noted that in Newman,
unlike Beacon and Benner, the covenant specifically prohibited mobile homes.

See id. at 928 (pointing out that the covenant included mobile homes among
the restricted structures); See also Benner, 673 N.E.2d at 206 (reciting rele-
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In Beacon, the mobile home was placed on a foundation, and
the owner proposed to build a garage and porch.222 The mobile
home, however, had a vehicle identification number and could be
hauled away from the site in the same manner it had been brought
to the site.223 As a result, the Tennessee Court of Appeals concluded that a double-wide mobile home was a temporary structure. 224
Although the court held that the mobile home was a trailer, it
appeared reluctant to do so.226 The court noted that because manufacturing methods and terminology have changed over the past
twenty years, it was difficult, using today's technology, to interpret
words like "trailer," "mobile home" and "manufactured home" that
were drafted many years ago. 226

The court commented that it

would be beneficial if the Supreme Court or legislature gave some
221
guidance on the definition of words that have evolving meanings.
The court in Benner also recognized the change in the characteristics of trailers over the years and identified the competing arguments. On the one hand, today's mobile homes still arrive on
wheels that can be reattached and, therefore, technically the home
remains mobile.2 On the other hand, once the structure is installed it takes on the character of a permanent structure.2 9 In
concluding that the defendant's home was not a trailer, the Ohio
Court of Appeals looked at the characteristics of the structure and
the financing. 20 First, it noted that the structure was a 1700
square foot ranch style double-wide mobile home. 23 1 Drywall was

used throughout the interior, and the exterior was covered with
vinyl siding.232 Plumbing, electric and heating were factory installed. 23' The owner shingled the roof, attached a garage at the

site and installed landscaping.2 The owner financed the structure
and lot by means of a mortgage, and it was taxed as real property. 5
In interpreting the terms "trailer," "mobile-home" and
vant covenant language which restricts a number of structures but did not
mention mobile homes); Beacon, 911 S.W.2d at 737 (indicating that the restrictive covenant failed to identify mobile homes).
222. Beacon, 911 S.W.2d at 738.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Benner, 673 N.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.

234. Benner, 673 N.E.2d at 207.

235. Id.
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"manufactured home," the court will look at the characteristics of
the structure, whether the state vehicle code and tax code consider
the home a vehicle and the form of financing." Because there is a
need for low and moderate income housing in many areas of the
country and because mobile homes are becoming more permanent
in character, it is likely that in close cases, courts will consider a
manufactured home a permanent structure (depending on the nature of the property). A court that wishes to conclude a mobile
home is not a trailer can always rely on the common law which
strictly construes ambiguous covenants against the drafter.
3. Courts Will Continue to Evaluate Whether the Covenants Grant
Authority to Enforce Architectural Restrictionsand Whether the
Enforcing Body Acted Reasonably
Assuming the meaning of the restriction is clear, the court
must next consider whether the architectural restriction appears
in the declaration, proprietary lease or board-enacted rules. If the
board enacts a restriction, a court must determine if the board had
authority to do so. In both Piccadilly Place Condominium Ass'n v.
Frantz"7 and Indian Hills Club Homeowner's Ass'n v. Cooper,' the
courts found the association did not have authority to enact the
particular rule at issue, and therefore, the association's actions
were invalid.
In Piccadilly, the association prohibited the defendant from
installing burglar bars on the inside of his unit." 9 The court concluded that the provision of the declaration that gave the board
authority to control the exterior of the units was not applicable to
the installation of burglar bars on the interior of the units.2°
Therefore, the owner could install the bars.
In Indian Hills, the board sought to enjoin the construction of
a driveway extension because it had not given the defendant
authority to make the improvement.2" The board refused to grant
permission because it said that it needed time to seek professional
assistance in evaluating the proposed construction." The declaration gave the board the right to disapprove any plans if the proposed structure would be inharmonious with other structures in
the neighborhood.24'
The declaration did not give the board

236. Id. at 209.

237. 436 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
238. 240 No. O1AO1-9507-CH-00319, 1995 WL 763823, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 1995). This case is not cited in Southwest Reporter and the reader is
cautioned to review Court of Appeals Rules 11 and 12 prior to citing this case.
239. Piccadilly, 436 S.E.2d at 728.
240. Id. at 729.
241. Indian Hills, 1995 WL 763823, at *1.
242. Id. at *2.
243. Id. at *1.
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authority to disapprove plans on the grounds that it needed time
to seek professional assistance.' While the court recognized that
restrictions requiring an owner to seek board approval for new
construction are generally valid, in this case, the board exceeded
its scope of authority.20 As a result, its action was invalid.
Not only must the board have the authority to act, its actions
must be reasonable. Again, the recent cases are consistent with
previous holdings. In Korandovitch v. Vista PlantationCondominium Ass'n,' the association refused to permit the owners to attach
street numbers to the exterior of their units.U7 The Florida District Court of Appeals concluded that whether the action was reasonable was a question of fact, but implied that the action was
not. m
In Goode v. Village of Woodgreen Homeowners Ass'n," an
owner submitted plans to the architectural committee as required
by the governing documents. ° The committee approved the plans
for a Victorian house, but the owner did not build according to the
plans.nl In evaluating whether the association was reasonable in
seeking an injunction, the Mississippi Supreme Court balanced the
rights of the individual owner against the rights of all other owners in the association who expected adherence to the general
scheme. 2 The court concluded that the association acted reasonably in enforcing the general scheme.253
In Dossey v.Hanover, Inc.,2 the defendant also failed to seek
architectural approval for revised plans for a home, but the Arkansas Court of Appeals refused to grant specific performance to the
association.2s The court noted that the covenants stated that the
architectural control committee was established to insure that
dwellings in the subdivision would be constructed of good quality
materials and workmanship and would be compatible with other
dwellings.ne Both architects who testified said that the revised
home did comply with the intent of the covenants. 7 Because the
244. Id. at *5.
245. Id. at *3, 6. It is significant that from 1992 when the owners controlled
the board until 1994 when construction began without board approval the
board did not seek professional assistance. Also, there were 14 other similar
driveway extensions in the neighborhood. Id. at *2.
246. 634 So.' 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
247. Id. at 274.
248. Id. at 275.
249. 662 So. 2d 1064 (Miss. 1995).
250. Id. at 1068.
251. Id. at 1069.
252. Id. at 1075.
253. Id.
254. 891 S.W.2d 67 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995).
255. Id. at 68, 70.
256. Id. at 69.
257. Id. at 70.
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violation was a technical violation, the court would not grant specific performance forcing the owners to comply.2m Therefore, a

court is likely to conclude the association is not acting reasonably
if it is merely trying to enforce a technical or insignificant violation
of the covenants.
Some boards believe that they must enforce every covenant
and rule in every situation, or they will waive their right to enforce
the covenant or rule. This is not the case. 59 Under the business
judgment rule, courts will not attempt to second-guess the association's judgment.2 ' Therefore, before a board strictly tries to enforce its rules, it should evaluate whether enforcement is reasonable in light of factors such as the likelihood of success and costs of
litigation. If enforcement is not reasonable, the board will waste a
great deal of time and money initiating and ultimately losing a
lawsuit.
Thus, in determining whether the association's architectural
decisions will be upheld, the court will first evaluate if the covenants pertaining to architectural approval are valid. Covenants
that grant the board authority to approve plans are generally upheld even if those covenants grant the board wide discretion. The
courts in Raintree and Goode indicated that the architectural control committee could refuse approval on any grounds, including
purely aesthetic grounds. 6'
If the covenants give the board authority to act, the court may
next determine if the board's actions are reasonable. Reasonableness is generally a question of fact, and the rights of the owners
that expect the common scheme to be enforced will be considered,
but the board need not be inflexible. In addition to the above, the
board must also follow the procedures for enforcing covenants and
rules according to the governing documents. These prescribed
procedures will be discussed in Section IV - Defenses.""
D. Assessments: There Are Three Clear Trends in Assessment
Collection Cases, and a Fourth That May Be Surfacing
1.

Affirmative Defenses to Enforcement Are Likely to Fail

First, affirmative defenses to enforcement of assessments
have not been successful in recent years. The courts have made it
258. Id.
259. See infra Part IV, Section A.1. for a discussion of the defense of waiver.
260. See Goldberg, supra note 110 for articles discussing the business judgment rule and the rule of reason.
261. Raintree Homeowners Ass'n v. Bleiman, 463 S.E.2d 72, 75 (N.C. 1995);

Goode v. Village of Woodgreen Homeowners Ass'n, 662 So. 2d 1064, 1068
(Miss. 1995).

262. See infra Part IV, Section B.2. for a discussion of how the failure to
follow procedures can be asserted as a defense.
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clear that an owner is not excused from the obligation to pay assessments established in the governing documents on the grounds
that he or she does not benefit from some of the services provided
by the association.2 6 In Turner v. Hi-CountryHomeowners Ass'n,"
the Utah Supreme Court held that the owner was required to pay
the special assessment for a security gate even though the owner's
lot was located outside the gate.265 The court relied on the governing documents which provided that an owner was required to pay
for services even if he did not use them.
Nor may an owner withhold assessments based on the association's alleged failure to maintain and repair common areas. In
Agassiz West Condominium Ass'n v. Solum, 267 the owner unsuccessfully alleged that he had a right to withhold assessments because the association failed to maintain the common area.' Also,
in Park Place Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Naber269 and Rea v.
Breakers Ass'n,27 ° the defendants were not allowed to introduce
evidence of the associations' alleged failure to maintain common
areas.271
2. Late Charges May Be Imposed, but They Must Be Reasonable
The clear trend is that while late charges may be imposed,
they must be reasonable. In Rea, the association imposed a
twenty-percent per month late charge on delinquent assessments
or a 240% per annum fee.272 The court concluded that the association could impose late fees, but that a 240% per annum late fee
violated the usury laws.273 In arriving at its conclusion, the court
looked to the statutory definition of "finance charge," which provided that such charges could not exceed five dollars or four percent per annum, whichever was greater. 74 Because it is likely

263. See Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 1226

(Utah 1996) (explaining that the covenant applies to members of the community as a whole and will terminate only if the community, as a whole, no
longer benefits from the services).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1224, 1226.
266. Id.
267. 527 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1995).
268. Id. at 247.
269. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
270. 674 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1996).
271. See Park Place, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 (holding that if members were

allowed to introduce evidence of the association's failure to maintain common
areas, it would detract from the court's power to enforce the association's
rules for payment of assessment fees); Rea, 674 So. 2d at 497 (requiring as-

sessment fees to be paid regardless of whether the common areas were maintained by the association).
272. 674 So. 2d at 497.
273. Id. at 500.
274. Id.
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other courts will look to their respective state statutes for guidance
in determining whether late charges are reasonable, one should
review the covenants and rules regarding late charges in relation
to the state's usury laws and statutes regarding finance charges.
3. Courts Will Not Recognize Counterclaims and Defenses That
Do Not Relate Directly to the Foreclosureof an Assessment Lien
Third, when an association sues to foreclose on a lien imposed
for failure to pay assessments, the owner may only raise defenses
or assert counterclaims relating to the association's right to collect
assessments and to seek foreclosure. Thus, owners could not assert a defense or counterclaim that the association was negligent
in failing to repair a deck, allegedly resulting in injury to the
owner,2 75 or that the association abused its discretion in purchasing
a private road."
4. CourtsAre Unlikely to GrantAssessment Liens Priorityover
the FirstMortgage or Trust Deed Unless a Statute or the Covenants
Specifically Providefor Priority
Although there are too few reported decisions to be certain
that a fourth trend exists, it probably does. For assessment liens
to take priority over the first mortgage or trust deed, the governing documents or the statute must clearly state that they do. In
Federal NationalMortgage Ass'n v. McKesson,277 the Florida Court
of Appeals reversed a lower court decision giving the homeowner
association's assessment lien priority in a mortgage foreclosure
action.278
Although the appellate court recognized Bessemer v. Gersten,279 an earlier case in which the Florida Supreme Court held
that the creation of an assessment lien related back to the time of
the filing of the declaration," ° the appellate court distinguished the
instant case. In McKesson, unlike Bessemer, "the declaration [did]
not purport to create an automatic lien" for delinquent assessments."' It simply created the right to a lien in the event that the

275. See Willow Springs Condo Ass'n v. Pereira, No. CV 95 0067067, 1995
WL 67033, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1995) (discussing the court's reluctance to recognize a counterclaim based on the association's alleged failure to
maintain a deck resulting in injury to the defendant).

276. See Panther Lake Homeowner's Ass'n v. Juergensen, 887 P.2d 465,468
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the alleged defect in the private road the
association acquired was not a defense to the owner's obligation to pay assessments).
277. 639 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
278. Id. at 80.
279. 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
280. Id. at 1348.
281. 639 So. 2d at 79.
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owner did not pay.2 8 2 The court concluded that a declaration that
does not specifically state the assessment lien is a continuing lien
that relates back, does not put a mortgagee on notice of the superiority of the lien.'m This holding is likely to be followed by other
courts because the purpose of the recording acts is to give notice
and create priorities of competing liens.
E. Fines
In the past it has been unclear whether the association could
impose fines for violation of the governing documents, and
whether fines, if imposed, could become a lien subject to foreclosure. With some jurisdictional exceptions, there is a clear trend in
favor of allowing associations to levy fines.2" It is less clear
whether foreclosure is an appropriate remedy when an owner fails
to pay fines.
1. Courts Are Likely to Enforce Covenants and Rules Authorizing
the Levying of Fines for Violations of Covenants
While it is true that some states prohibit associations from
imposing fines by statute,' other legislatures and courts have increasingly recognized the advantages of imposing fines to gain
compliance with the governing documents. In Liebler v. Point
Loma Tennis Club,'m the association imposed fines against an
owner for inappropriately using the tennis courts. 7 The owner defended by alleging that the board lacked authority to subject him
to fines because the declaration did not expressly give the association the authority to levy fines.' The California Court of Appeals
pointed out that the declaration gave the board authority to create
rules and regulations in connection with the use of the property."
282. Id.
283. Id. Had the lien in McKesson involved a condominium instead of a
homeowners- association, Florida statute would limit the liability of the first
mortgagee who acquires title by foreclosure or by deed to the unpaid assessments up to six months or one percent of the original mortgage debt. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1)(b) (1997). The Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act provides for a similar limited superior lien in all types of common interest

communities. Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-116 (West 1995
& Supp. 1997).
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.8 & cmt.

(Tentative Draft No. 14, forthcoming May 1998).
285. See Unit Owners Ass'n of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378,
384 (Va. 1982) (discussing the Condominium Act of Virginia which "does not
purport to grant an association the power to secure compliance with its by-

laws, rules, and regulations by the imposition of a fine or the exaction of a
penalty").

286.
287.
288.
289.

47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 785.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 790.
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475

Rules adopted by the board provided that enforcement of the covenants could be carried out in a fair and timely manner by means of
fines and other legal action."' Thus, the documents, when read together, did authorize the board to impose fines.9
Further, the
board adhered to a California statute2 2 which establishes procedures an association must follow if it chooses to impose fines. ' As
a result, the court found that the fines were valid, although it did
not speculate on whether the fines could be collected by imposing a
lien on the property as that issue was not before the court.'
The Massachusetts Appeals Court also found that the
authority of an association to impose fines may be reasonably
implied even when a declaration does not expressly grant the association such authority. In Glen Devin Condominium Ass'n v.
Makhluf,25 the declaration gave the association "all... the powers
and duties reasonably necessary to operate the Condominium."2
The court concluded that fines were an expeditious and cost effective method for enforcement of the covenants in the declaration.
It, therefore, found the fines were valid.
For a while, it appeared that New Jersey would not follow the
trend. A New Jersey court held in Walker v. Briarwood Condo
Ass'n,"8 that an association could not impose fines for violation of
the governing documents because in order to do so the authority
would have to exist both in the condominium statute and the governing documents.'
At the time the case was decided there was
no authority in either."° Subsequently, however, the New Jersey
legislature amended its statute to permit the imposition of fines.ol
Thus, if there is authority to impose fines in the governing statute,
the board may do so.
2. Courts Will Continue to Require Fines to Be Reasonable in
Amount and Reasonably Imposed
Assuming the board has the express or implied authority to
impose fines, two additional issues must be addressed. First, are

290. Id.

291. Id.
292. CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1363(g) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
293. Liebler, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.

294. Id. at 790 & n.8.
295. No. 9284, 1994 WL 675253, at *1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 25, 1994).

296. Id. at *2.
297. Id. at *3.See also MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 183A, § 10(b)(5) (Law. Co-op.
1996) (authorizing a condominium association "to levy reasonable fines for
violations of the master deed, trust, by-laws, restrictions, rules or regulations
of the organization of unit owners").
298. 644 A.2d 634 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
299. Id. at 637.

300. Id.
301. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8b-15(f) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
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the fines reasonable? Second, did the board follow proper procedures in imposing them?
In Stewart v. Kopp,"°' the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that it was not unreasonable for a board to fine a unit owner
$100 per day for continuing violations of the architectural restrictions of the governing documents.0 3 The court noted that the statute permitted condominium associations to levy fines not to exceed
$150 for violations of the condominium documents. 3°4 It reasoned
that the purpose of fines is to gain compliance with the governing
documents.0 5 If the board could not continue to impose a fine for
each day an owner was in violation of the governing documents,
the owner could pay $150, ignore the association and continue to
violate the governing documents."a Therefore, the court held that
the continuing fine was valid and that the board could collect it by
filing
a lien on the offending owner's property pursuant to stat30 7
ute.
The Florida appellate court also recognized the right to fine in
Kittel-Glass v. Oceans Four Condominium Ass'n,' °8 but only if the
board has complied with the appropriate procedures.0 9 In this
case, the association imposed $3,950 in fines against an owner for
seventy-nine separate violations of the governing documents
amounting to fifty dollars per violation.3 0 The court concluded
that the association. had the authority to fine, and that fifty dollars
per violation was a reasonable fine.311 The board, however, had
only charged the owner with fourteen violations in writing, and
because the governing documents required written notification of
the violations the association could not charge the owner more
than $700 or fifty dollars times fourteen violations.312
Although legislatures and courts are increasingly upholding
the right to fine, there is one note of caution. While some cases
recognize an implied authority in the association to impose fines,
others, such as Stewart, are based in part on a statute applicable
only to condominiums. It is unclear how these courts would treat
fines imposed by homeowner associations. Also, while cases like
Stewart hold that condominium associations can file liens to collect
the fines, there are too few cases to determine whether there is a
trend in this direction either in the courts or legislatures. Finally,
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

454 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
648 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 829.
Id.
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even in those jurisdictions recognizing the authority of the association to impose fines, fines will only be found valid if the association has followed the proper procedures. This issue will be discussed in Part IV dealing with defenses.
IV. DEFENSES
Previous sections of this Article have discussed covenants
which may not be enforceable because they violate public policy or
are unreasonable, 13 board rules which are not enforceable because
they are not authorized or are unreasonable, " and defenses
unique to assessment collection cases. 15 This portion of the Article
will discuss additional defenses.
A.

Where Courts Have DiscretionDefenses Are Likely to Fail

Because there is a trend in favor of courts recognizing the importance of covenants, one would expect to find courts reluctant to
hold that a defense prevents enforcement when it is within their
discretion to do so. This is, in fact, the case.
1.

The Defense of Waiver Is Likely to Fail

To successfully prove waiver, one must prove the party attempting to enforce the covenant intentionally waived a known
right. Failure to enforce a covenant once, or failure to enforce unrelated covenants, will not establish the defense.
8
In Mizell v. Deal,"'
the plaintiff developed a twenty-acre
community of mini-farms controlled by covenants.3 7 The defendants lived in a mobile home for three and one-half years on a lot
that violated a covenant prohibiting mobile homes for more than
two years. 8 When the plaintiff sued to enforce the covenant, the
defendant asserted that the plaintiff had waived his right to enforce the covenant. 9 The Florida Court of Appeals reasoned that
for the defense of waiver to be successful, there had to be a longterm acquiescence in the violation.3 2' Further, the violations had

313. See supra Part II, Section B. (examining cases where covenants may
not be enforced as where they are deemed to violate public policy or are unreasonable).
314. See supra Part III, Section A. (reviewing cases where board rules may

not be enforceable if they are not authorized, are unreasonable or are not
consistent with the governing documents and law).
315. See supra Part III, Section D. (discussing affirmative defenses to enforcement of assessments).

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

654 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663.
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to be persistent, obvious and widespread, which they were not. 2'
In Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings," there were
numerous violations of the covenants, but the Supreme Court of
Washington still refused to find waiver. 23 In this case, the association sued to enforce a covenant prohibiting television antennas. 3' The defendant asserted that several covenants had been
violated, such as the parking of illegal vehicles." The court held
that the violation of unrelated covenants was not relevant unless
there were so many violations of so many covenants that the
3
scheme was entirely frustrated. 26
This is particularly true where
there is a provision in the governing documents, as there was in
Mountain Park, providing that the invalidity of one covenant does
not affect the validity of the remaining covenants."'
Even multiple violations of the same covenant may not be
sufficient if those violations are of a different character. In Kneale
v. Bonds,"8 owners in a condominium community sued to stop an
owner from erecting a 2,200 square foot addition which would have
encroached upon the common area.3 9 Although the board had approved the addition, the addition violated the covenants. 0 The
court recognized that the board had approved various additions
and alterations in violation of the covenants."' It found, however,
that the previous violations were of a different size and nature in
that they were predominately aesthetic and did not encroach so
substantially on the common area." Therefore, the court refused
to find that the covenants had been waived."'3
The Louisiana Court of Appeals in Travasos v. Stoma,' also
held that numerous previous violations of covenants do not automatically mean that they have been waived."' One must consider
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
883 P.2d 1383 (Wash. 1994).
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1387. See also Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owners

Ass'n, 895 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that courts have refused to

enforce restrictions "where lot owners have acquiesced in such substantial
violations within the restricted areas as to amount to abandonment of the
covenant or waiver of the right to enforce it").
327. Mountain Park, 883 P.2d at 1387. See also Webb v. Johnson, 671 So. 2d

1120 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a covenant within a severability clause
which provided that invalidation of any one of the covenants did not affect
other restrictions).
328. 452 S.E.2d 840 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
329. Id. at 841.
330. Id. at 841-42.
331. Id. at 842.
332. Id. at 843.
333. Id.
334. 672 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
335. Id. at 1074.
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the character, number and proximity of the violations.336 Thus,
even though the defendants had installed a metal roof in violation
of the covenants approximately ten years prior to the filing of the
lawsuit, and had signs, garbage bins and landscaping in violation
of the governing documents, the covenant prohibiting metal roofs
had not been waived.1 7 First, the covenants not related to the
metal roof were not relevant.3 " Second, the previously existing
39
metal roof was not visible or adjacent to plaintiffs property.
Therefore, the association did not waive the covenant prohibiting
metal buildings, and prohibited the defendant from building a second metal building adjacent to the plaintiffs property.' 0
It is unclear if a court will refuse to recognize the defense of
waiver solely because a declaration or proprietary lease contains a
provision stating that failure to enforce a covenant shall not be
deemed a waiver of the right to enforce it. The Texas Court of Appeals in Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owners Ass'n,34 '
however, cited such a provision in concluding that the owners
could not successfully assert waiver.342 The court noted that the
provision was included to protect lot owners and the association
from claims that the covenant had been waived for failure to
prosecute.343
Most associations fail to prosecute covenant violations because they do not have the funds, not because they are intentionally waiving a known right. When it is clear that the association is
not intentionally waiving its right to enforce the covenant, and
there is a provision in the governing documents that provides failure to enforce does not constitute waiver, courts should be reluctant to find that the association or owners have waived their
rights.
Thus, courts are unlikely to find waiver if there has only been
one previous violation of a particular covenant, if there have been
multiple violations of the covenant, but they are of a different
character, or if the previous violations are of unrelated covenants.
Further, if there is a provision in the declaration or proprietary
lease that says that failure to enforce a covenant does not constitute waiver of the right to enforce, courts will be much more reluctant to find a waiver.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Travasos,672 So.2d at 1075.
895 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 787.
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2. The Defense of Changed CircumstancesIs Likely to Fail
Recent cases have reaffirmed that in order to establish the defense of changed circumstances, the party contesting enforcement
must prove that there has been such a radical change in surrounding circumstances that the purpose of the covenant has been essentially destroyed. One or two minor changes will not suffice.
For example, in Williams v. Paley,' the North Carolina Court
of Appeals held that residential use restrictions could only be
terminated by the substantial commercial use of multiple nearby
properties!" Property rentals to vacationers, operation of a bed
and breakfast, use of one property for one rental transaction,
leasing of a lot to store machinery and the use of a lot as a sales
office for condominium units were not sufficient to defeat the essential purpose of the covenant. w Therefore, defendants did not
establish the defense of changed circumstances.
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Stolba v. Vesci, 7
found that a covenant restricting buildings to private homes continued to prohibit condominiums even though the size of the lots in
the area had decreased, there was a trend toward higher density
development and the Condominium Act had been enacted.m The
court noted that a change of condition in part of a restricted area
does not prevent enforcement in the remaining restricted area,
and that a change in the law is not the type of change contemplated by the doctrine of changed circumstances. 49
The Florida Court of Appeals went further in Mizell v. Dell.350
It noted that even a change in the condition of the entire neighborhood will not prevent enforcement if the restriction is still of
benefit and substantial value to the dominant lot."' The test is
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the change
is so radical as to render the restriction valueless to the parties. 52
B. Where Courts Do Not Have Discretion,Defenses Will Likely
Succeed
1. Because Courts Have Little Discretionwhen Enforcing Time
Limitations, Time Limitations Will Remain a Viable Defense
Because of the courts increased respect for covenants, they
are less likely to recognize defenses to enforcement when they
344. 442 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Id. at 562.
346. Id.
347. 909 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. App. 1995).

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 710.
Id.
654 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 662.
Id.
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have the discretion to do so. However, they generally must recognize time limitations and are likely to continue to strictly enforce
them. Time limitations sometimes can be found in the governing
documents. For example, if the governing documents state that
the board is deemed to have approved an owner's proposed improvements if it fails to act within a specified time, the board loses
its right to object if it fails to comply with the time requirements. 353
Time limitations can also be found in city ordinances. In
Board of Managers v. LaMontanero,M the condominium community had a no-pet restriction. A New York City ordinance which
applied to multiple dwellings, and, therefore condominiums,535
provided that an action to remove an animal had to be commenced
within three months of the discovery of the animal.356 The association missed the filing deadline by one day and, thus, could not
enforce the pet restriction against the owner.57
Time limitations, of course, also exist in statutes. Two different types of statutes of limitation can apply to violations of covenants: those relating to continuing nuisance and those relating to
a violation of a written instrument or covenant. In Cutujian v.
Benedict Hills Estates Ass'n,3 the California appellate court held
that the statute of limitations for a homeowner association's
breach of duties under the covenants begins at the time the landowner demands performance. 35 The owner, who discovered during
escrow that a surface slope occurred on his lot several years earlier, demanded that the association repair his lot as required by
the covenants.'
The association argued that the owner's claim
was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations for
written instruments. 361 The court held that the statute began to
run only when the plaintiff first demanded that the association repair the slope damage.3"'
This case raises several questions. The damage occurred on
the plaintiffs separate lot. The court did not distinguish, however,
between failure to repair damage to the common area and failure
to repair damage to the owner's lot. Assume, therefore, that in
1990 the association, in violation of the governing documents,
failed to maintain ten trees on the common area, and the trees
353. Hunt v. Sharp, 608 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).

354. 616 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
355. But see Board of Managers of Parkchester N. Condominiums v. Quiles,
651 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (stating that a condominium
should not be considered a multiple dwelling under the act).
356. LaMontanero,616 N.Y.S.2d at 745.

357. Id.
358. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).

359. Id. at 1384.
360. Id. at 1382.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1384.

The John Marshall Law Review

[31:443

died. If one owner complained in 1990, another one complained in
1992 and another in 2000, when does the statute of limitations
begin to run? Is this a continuing nuisance case even though the
trees are dead?
The Montana Supreme Court found that the continuing nuisance doctrine, with its accompanying statute of limitations, did
not apply in Country Estates Homeonwers Ass'n v. McMillan.m In
this case the association tried to enforce a covenant that provided
all construction had to be completed within one year from the date
construction began. 3" While it was unclear precisely when construction began, the latest it began was 1982 or 1983." The statute of limitations provided that an action on a written instrument
had to be commenced within eight years.3w
The association argued that failure to complete construction
was a continuing nuisance and, therefore, each day was a new
violation with a new statute.37 The court, however, rejected the
association's argument because it found that the association
brought an action based on breach of the restrictive covenants, not
on a nuisance theory." The court distinguished the continuing
nuisance cases that applied to developers' failures to perform
be69
cause public policy held developers to a higher standard.
It is interesting to note that the Cutujian court based its decision to apply the continuing nuisance statute on a fairness theory. The court determined that it would be unfair to the owner if
the developer were able to bar a cause of action through its continued failure to repair the slope when it controlled the board. 70° Perhaps, in the example above, even the California courts would apply
the four-year statute based on written instruments.
A final time limitation is laches. Laches occurs when the
party desiring to enforce the covenant has unreasonably delayed in
filing a lawsuit causing detriment to the defendant. 71 With this
defense, unlike the above, the court has more discretion because
the defense is based on a factual determination. 72 Although courts
are less likely to uphold defenses where they have discretion, that
does not mean that those attempting to enforce covenants will always be successful under these circumstances.
In Nutile Acres Ass'n v. Conroy,7 8 the association brought an
363. 915 P.2d 806, 808-09 (Mont. 1996).
364. Id. at 807.

365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id.

369. Country Estates, 915 P.2d at 808.

370. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
371. POWELL, supra note 1, § 60. 10[1].

372. Id.
373. No. CV940363624S, 1996 WL 24696, at *1 (Conn. Jan. 4, 1996).
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action against an owner to foreclose on a lien based upon delinquent assessments from 1980 to 1992. 3"4 The defendant purchased
the unit in 1983. 875 The association relied on the declaration that
provided a continuing lien for unpaid assessments.3 7' The only ac-77
tual lien that the association filed was for the years 1980-1981.3
This is an egregious case of an association slumbering on its
rights. 78 Therefore, the fact that the court found laches in this
case does not indicate it will do so in less egregious cases.
2. Courts Are Unlikely to Enforce Covenants and Rules Where the
Appropriate ProceduresHave Not Been Followed
Covenants and rules usually provide procedures that must be
followed when enforcing them. Courts are likely to strictly construe these provisions. This point was made by the California appellate court in Ironwood Owners Ass'n IX v. Solomon,379 when it
refused to grant the association a summary judgment even though
it recognized that the owner has planted trees in violation of the
governing documents.The court concluded that although the
owner did not apply for approval as required by the covenants,
there was a material question of fact as to whether the architectural committee followed the procedures provided in the governing
documents. 1 The procedures required the committee to meet to
consider whether the trees violated the covenants and to make
findings that the trees did not meet the standards stated in the
covenants.' Thus, even though the owner failed to seek architectural approval, which was required by the covenants, the court refused to grant an injunction to have the trees removed."
Failure to follow procedures was also an issue in two more recent cases, one decided by an appellate court in Texas and the
other by an appellate court in Florida. In Ashcreek Homeowner's
Ass'n v. Smith," the Texas appellate court refused to grant an injunction removing a basketball hoop that violated the covenants
because the association failed to give the owner notice as required

374.
375.
376.
377.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

378. Prior to this decision, Connecticut had adopted the Common Interest

Ownership Act. Section 47-258(e) of the Act provides that an association must
bring an action within two years of the assessment becoming due or the lien is
extinguished. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-258(e) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
379. "178 Cal. App. 3d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 772.
Id.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 773.
902 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App. 1995).
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by the declaration.&' Similarly, the Florida appellate court in Kittel-Glass v. Oceans Four Condominium Ass'n,' refused to enforce
sixty-five of an owner's seventy-nine violations because the association did not give the owner notice of sixty-five of the violations
as required by the governing documents.
Procedures can also be required by statute. For example,
California Corporations Code § 7341"8 requires the association to
follow fair and reasonable procedures (examples of which are given
in the statute) before it can suspend an owner's membership
rights, even if the owner is violating the governing documents. If
these procedures are not met, courts are unlikely to uphold the associations actions.
C. CourtsAre Likely to Find That More Covenants and Rules
Violate One of Two Federal Statutes
Obviously, both covenants and board-enacted rules must
comply with both state and federal statutes. The state statutes are
too numerous to discuss, but there are at least two relevant federal
statutes that directly impact covenant enforcement: the Fair
Housing Act 89 and the Telecommunications Act. 39°
1. FederalDistrict Court Judges Treat Defendants Accused of
Violations of the FairHousing Act Less Harshly Than Do
AdministrativeLaw Judges
Although a discussion of the Fair Housing Act is beyond the
scope of this article, in general, it prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national original, handicap or
familial status.3 9' Recent cases have focused on covenants that discriminate against families with children392 and board enacted rules
that discriminate on the basis of handicap. 9'
385. Id. at 590.
386. 648 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

387. Id. at 829.
388. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7341 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997).
389. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631(West 1994 & Supp. 1997). See Edward Allen,
Six Years After Passage of the FairHousing Amendments Act: Discrimination
Against Families with Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297 (1995), for addi-

tional background information on the federal Fair Housing Act. See CURTIS
G. SPROUL & KATHARINE ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM

AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS, Ch. 9 (Cont.Ed.Bar 1991 & Supp. 1997), for

a discussion of the interrelation between the federal Fair Housing Act and
California fair housing law.
390. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).

391. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
392. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (identifying com-

munities exempted from the Act).
393. See Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 332-36 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding a cooperative board rule to be in violation of the Act where the rule
assigned parking spaces on a first come, first serve basis, thereby failing to
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An aggrieved party can file a complaint with the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or can file a civil action
in federal district court.394 Assuming HUD finds evidence of discrimination, and neither party wishes to file a court action, the
matter will be handled by an administrative law judge. 395
One trend that has surfaced is that defendants in housing
discrimination cases fare worse in administrative hearings than
they do in the courts. For example, damages for emotional distress
based on violations of the Fair Housing Act were not awarded in
United States v. Lepore"96 or Morgan v. Secretary of HUD,97 both
federal district court cases, but damages were awarded in HUD v.
39 9
TEMS Ass'n39 and HUD v. Paradise Gardens,
both administrative law cases.
Evidence of the different treatment also is found in Morgan
where, because the court concluded that the Secretary of HUD did
not conciliate in good faith, the court reversed the administrative
law judge's award of damages for emotional distress and inconvenience, and reduced the penalty award from $10,000 to $500. 400
Also, in Pfaff v. HUD,4"' the Ninth Circuit severely criticized HUD
for its behavior in bringing an action against a retired couple who
40 2
had reasonable occupancy standards for their rental property.
The court reversed an administrative law judge's award against
the couple for compensatory damages, punitive damages and a
civil penalty. 3 Consequently, when HUD finds that covenants or
rules violate the federal Fair Housing Act, those wishing to have
the covenant or rule upheld should consider having the case heard
in federal court.
2. The Amendments to the TelecommunicationsAct Are Too
Recent to Identify Trends but They Invalidate Many Existing
Covenants
Another federal statute that impacts covenant and rule enforcement is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which provides
the FCC will promulgate regulations to prohibit restrictions that
impair a viewer's ability to receive video programming through,
among other things, antennas and direct broadcast satellite
make reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons living in the cooperative).
394. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

395. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
396. 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1023-24 (M.D.Pa. 1991).
397. 985 F.2d 1451, 1459-60 (10th Cir. 1993).

398. 2A Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (PH) 25,028 (June 1, 1992).
399. 2A Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (PH) 25,0237 (Dec. 1, 1992).
400. Morgan, 816 F. Supp. at 1461.

401. 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996).
402. Id. at 749-50.
403. Id.
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dishes. ' ° On August 6, 1996, the FCC promulgated 47 C.F.R. §
25.104.405 This regulation, which applies only to individuals who
own or have exclusive use of the area in which they wish install an
antenna, provides that no private covenant or homeowners' association rule may impair the installation, maintenance or use of an
antenna, including those designed to receive direct broadcast satellite service, if the satellite dish is one meter or less in diameter."
Examples of covenants or rules that unreasonably impair installation include those that 1) unreasonably delay or prevent installation, maintenance, or use; 2) unreasonably increase the cost
of installation, maintenance, or use; and 3) preclude reception of
an acceptable quality signal. °7 A restriction that is otherwise
prohibited is permitted if the restriction is necessary to accomplish
a clearly defined safety objective that is stated in the 4restriction or
described in a document as applied to that restriction. 0
One may petition the FCC to determine whether a restriction
is permitted or prohibited. However, "restrictions cannot require
that relatively unobtrusive satellite dishes be screened by expensive landscaping. On the other hand, a requirement to paint an
antenna in a fashion that will not interfere with reception so that
it blends in the background against which it is mounted would
likely be acceptable." ° The FCC is in the process of adopting rules
regarding installation of satellite dishes and antennas on the
common areas. They are expected to be adopted by the spring of
1998.
Because the amendments are less than one year old, and not
all of the rules have been promulgated, it is too soon to determine
with any degree of certainty, the exact impact of the statute. It is
certain, however, that the statute has invalidated many existing
covenants.
V. CONCLUSION
Covenants are presently controlling millions of American
lives. They control important aspects of peoples' lives including
what they are permitted to do in their homes, the exterior appearance of their homes, the number and types of pets they may own
and their behavior toward their neighbors. Because so many people are, and will increasingly continue to be affected by covenants,
and because covenants so significantly affect the way people are
permitted to live, there will continue to be a large number of reported decisions in this area of law.
404. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
405. 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1996).
406. Id.

407. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000(a)(2) (1997).
408. Id. § 1.4000(b)(1).

409. Id. § 1.4000(d).
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This article has surveyed cases from the past few years and
identified trends in covenant enforcement to assist the practitioner
and those affected by covenants in predicting which covenants and
rules will be enforceable in the future and which will not be. It
will be important for those affected by this field to continue to
monitor the decisions because this is a rapidly evolving area of law
impacting the lives of many.

